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Recent research has shown that pro-social prospective memory, i.e., remembering to
do something for others, is negatively affected by the presence of small material rewards.
While this competition between pro-social and self-gain motives leads to poor memory
for the intention, people do not seem to be aware of the possible collision effects of
competing motives (Brandimonte et al., 2010). Extending research on this general topic,
in two activity-based prospective memory (PM) experiments, we explored the effects
of different types and amount of rewards on pro-social prospective remembering. In
Experiment 1, participants could receive no reward, a low material reward (1 euro), or
a high material reward (20 euro) for their pro-social PM action. In Experiment 2, their
pro-social PM performance could be rewarded or not with an image reward (disclosure
of their altruistic behavior). Results revealed that introducing a small material reward
(Experiment 1) or a non-material reward (Experiment 2) impaired pro-social PM. However,
introducing a high material reward eliminated the impairment (Experiment 1). Importantly,
in Experiment 1, ongoing task performance in the pro-social condition was faster than
in the No PM condition. However, in Experiment 2, ongoing task costs emerged in the
presence of a non-material reward, as compared to the pro-social condition. Also, results
from two independent ratings showed that people’s predictions on their future pro-social
actions were at odds (Experiment 1) or in line (Experiment 2) with actual PM performance.
It is suggested that, according to the nature and amount of rewards, memory for a
pro-social future action may be modulated by conscious or unconscious motivational
mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Remembering to do things in the future is known as prospective memory (PM). In the past
decades, research on the cognitive mechanisms underlying PM has made enormous progress (see
Brandimonte et al., 1996; Kliegel et al., 2008). However, some researchers have recently noticed
(Ellis and McGann, 2005; Brandimonte and Ferrante, 2008; Altgassen et al., 2010; Brandimonte
et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2015) that investigating this important aspect of everyday life only in
terms of a cognitive analysis neglects the fundamental social and motivational components of
this activity (see also Meacham and Kushner, 1980). Indeed, whereas there is a large body of
empirical studies that investigated the cognitive processes underlying PM, only few studies so far
have explored motivational PM processes. Penningroth and Scott (2007) suggested a goal-based
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motivational-cognitive model according to which motivation to
fulfill an intention increases whenever an intention becomes
relevant for one’s personal goals, thereby influencing encoding,
maintaining, and retrieving of the intention. Most recently, Cook
et al. (2015) examined what they termed value-added intentions
by manipulating the cognitive frame associated with monetary
contingencies for detecting PM cues. A loss-frame was associated
with a monetary punishment for failing to respond to cues
while a gain-frame was associated with a monetary reward for
remembering to respond to cues. Results showed that both
gain and loss frames improved PM compared with a no-frame
condition, and that this increase in PM is not associated with an
increase in ongoing costs.
Motivation may influence the completion of intentions in
various ways. It is well established that motivation directs
behavior toward specific goals and may be modulated by the
presence of rewards. Often, rewards increase motivation and
improve cognitive performance (e.g., Pochon et al., 2002; Cook
et al., 2015). However, providing a reward does not automatically
and consistently increases motivation. Much depends on the
nature and amount of reward, and on how the reward is perceived
by the person (Locke and Braver, 2008). For instance, if the
activity is one that individuals would do in the absence of rewards
(see Deci and Ryan, 2000), introducing a material incentive
makes people feel controlled by the reward. As a consequence,
intrinsic motivation decreases and so does pro-social behavior.
In the economic arena, this decrease in the quality and amount of
pro-social behavior has been attributed to “motivation crowding
out” and it has been documented both in field and laboratory
experiments (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003).
In the neuroscience literature, there is abundance of evidence
of a strict relationship between the magnitude of the brain
activation and the magnitude of the rewards (or punishments)
received. However, to the best of our knowledge, only two
neuroimaging studies (Murayama et al., 2010; Albrecht et al.,
2014) tracked the neural correlates of motivation crowding
out using functional MRI. Murayama et al.’s study provides
evidence that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system plays a
central role in the undermining effect. Specifically, results suggest
that performance-based monetary reward indeed undermines
intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the decreased number
of voluntary engagements in the task (people do not feel
subjective value in succeeding in the task). In particular, activity
in the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas (LPFC)
decreased along with this behavioral undermining effect. These
findings suggest that the corticobasal ganglia valuation system
underlies the undermining effect through the integration of
extrinsic reward value and intrinsic task value. Activation in
the anterior part of the striatum mimics the pattern observed
in the behavioral undermining effect. This supports recent
psychological suggestions that the undermining effect is closely
linked to a decreased sense of self-determination due to
motivation crowding out.
Albrecht et al.’s (2014) study investigated the neural
processes underlying the effects of monetary and verbal rewards
on intrinsic motivation. Their results did not support the
crowding-out effect due to monetary rewards. However, they
found an effect of verbal rewards on brain activation: Activation
in the anterior striatum and midbrain was higher after the
administration of verbal rewards than in the control group.
Once again, the activation in the striatum might reflect a higher
perceived self-determination—a key component of the crowding-
in effect (Deci and Ryan, 1985).
In the PM domain, much progress has been made in the
last 15 years on the neural basis of PM (for a meta-analysis,
see Cona et al., 2015). The majority of the studies focused on
the role of the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC, Brodmann’s
area 10), which appears to play a crucial role in maintaining
intention (see Burgess et al., 2011, for a review). In particular, PM
conditions are associated with increased activity in lateral aPFC
(BA 10) and decreased activity in medial aPFC (BA 10). Burgess
et al. (2005, 2007) explained these results by proposing that
lateral aPFC mediates attending to internal representations, i.e.,
stimulus-independent (SI) processes, such as delayed intentions
for future actions. By contrast, medial aPFC is important for
attending to external perceptual information, so that it mediates
stimulus-oriented (SO) processes.
Interestingly for the purpose of the present studies, Cona et al.
(2015) suggested that if the ongoing task is highly demanding,
it would prevent individuals to be fully engaged in strategic
monitoring, with the result that dorsal frontoparietal and
cognitive control regions would be less involved. Momennejad
and Haynes (2013) found that when the ongoing task load is
high, individuals might be more likely to rely upon spontaneous
processes that are governed by the reactive transient activity of
insula/ventral frontoparietal network.
Despite the progress in the identification of the neural
correlates of PM, research on motivation crowding-out in PM is
still in its infancy and only behavioral data have been collected
so far. Indeed, understanding the motivational underpinnings of
memory for intentions is a complex task. Extant studies have been
almost exclusively devoted to the analysis of the motivational
mechanisms underlying standard PM tasks (e.g., Cook et al.,
2015), i.e., memory for future actions that benefit the person
who performs the action. In fact, however, often our memory for
intentions involves remembering to do things for others rather
than for ourselves and typically we feel more confident that we
will remember to perform an action in the future if our goal has a
pro-social value (Brandimonte et al., 2010). Thus, contrary to the
widespread belief that people are positively motivated by reward
incentives, recent studies in the economic and psychological
literature have shown that performance-based extrinsic reward
can actually undermine a person’s intrinsic motivation to engage
in a task. A recent study by Brandimonte and colleagues
showed that memory for an intention can be modulated by
such social variables as the direction of the benefit (for the
participant or for another person) derived from the person’s
action and the presence of rewards (Brandimonte and Ferrante,
2008; Brandimonte et al., 2010). Namely, it has been shown
that memory for an intention improves when the participant’s
action has a social relevance (i.e., it produces a benefit for
another person). However, in accordance with social (e.g., Deci,
1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985, 2000) and economic (Gneezy and
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Rustichini, 2000; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole,
2006) theories of altruism, introducing a small material reward
decreases intrinsic motivation, hence impairing pro-social PM.
Notably, the potential conflict between pro-social and self-
gainmotives appears to operate outside of the person’s awareness.
To date, in Brandimonte et al.’s (2010) study, successful PM
performance was accompanied by faster response times in
the ongoing task under pro-social conditions as compared to
standard conditions. In addition, when independent participants
evaluated how likely they would be in everyday life to perform the
pro-social action under various reward conditions, they predicted
they would be less likely to perform the action if they were to help
others without reward than with reward. However, in contrast
with the ratings, performance of experimental participants in
the pro-social PM conditions was impaired when a material
reward was expected (Brandimonte et al., 2010). Taken together,
these results suggest a prominent role of latent motivational
mechanisms in guiding memory for pro-social intentions. On the
other hand, being the first results documenting adverse effects
of rewards on memory for intentions, a more subtle analysis of
the specific role of rewards in activating/inhibiting pro-social PM
through their interaction with intrinsic motivation is needed.
Accordingly, the purpose of the present article is to extend
research on the above topic by investigating, for the first time,
how pro-social prospective remembering is affected by two
different classes of rewards: material rewards (money) and image
rewards (disclosure of altruistic behavior). Brandimonte et al.
(2010) showed that people’s memory for actions that would
benefit another person is negatively sensitive to the presence
of small material rewards. However, there is much evidence
supporting one of the broadest principles of behaviorism
concerning how rewards may increase the frequency of our
behaviors, both in everyday life and in experimental settings. For
example, research on the effects of rewards on performance in
standard (i.e., non-prosocial) PM tasks has typically documented
better performance under material reward conditions (Meacham
and Singer, 1977; Somerville et al., 1983; Cook et al., 2015). Thus,
how to reconcile these two apparently opposite bulks of results?
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), in one of the most known
experiments in the social psychology field, showed an inverse
relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change.
Participants were asked how much they had enjoyed a boring
and tedious task after they were requested to lie to a confederate
saying that the task was exciting. Those who received only $1 to
make the counter-attitudinal statement to the confederate rated
the task as significantly more enjoyable than participants who
had either received the larger sum of $20 or no incentive. Those
who received 20$ solved the conflict for pro-social reasons and
for self-gain reasons, while those who received only 1$ for lying,
solved the conflict being congruent with their statement, as if they
were not lying. A first question arising from those findings, which
has received no answer so far, is which amount of reward makes
intrinsic motivation decrease so as to defeat pro-social PM. A
second question is whether pro-social PM is differentially affected
by different types of reward, as it should be hypothesized on the
basis of results from the neuroscience literature. For instance,
more intangible rewards, such as image rewards that may affect
one’s own reputation, should have a differential effect on different
task performance.
In the economic domain, Bénabou and Tirole (2006)
suggested that although a greater prominence and memorability
of contributions –such as disclosure of giving behavior- generally
encourages pro-social behavior (because individuals mostly care
about their social reputation), disclosure of altruistic behavior
may conflict with the intrinsic motivation to help others. Indeed,
for some persons, visibility of their good actions may make
them become suspected of being motivated by appearances,
whichmay reduce intrinsic motivation to remember and perform
the intended pro-social action. If so, introducing a social-
image reward may have a detrimental effect on motivation and,
therefore, on pro-social PM.
To address the above issues, in Experiment 1 we manipulated
the amount of a material reward (money) in a simple activity-
based PM task (signing a form for the benefit of another person
at the end of a highly demanding ongoing activity), so as to obtain
high (20 euro), low (1 euro), and no reward conditions under
socially relevant situations.
Research on the effects of rewards on performance in standard
(i.e., non-pro-social) PM tasks typically documented better
performance under material reward than no reward conditions
(Meacham and Singer, 1977; Somerville et al., 1983; Cook
et al., 2015). However, recently, it has been shown that if a
small material reward was introduced in a PM task, it had
no effect under standard PM conditions while it impaired PM
performance under pro-social conditions (Brandimonte et al.,
2010). In addition, in the absence of a reward, memory for
the intention was better under pro-social than under standard
(i.e., Non-pro-social) PM conditions. In our first experiment,
we therefore expected to observe reduced pro-social PM
performance under low reward conditions, as compared to both
No reward and High reward conditions.
In Experiment 2, pro-social prospective behavior could be
rewarded or not with an image reward (i.e., disclosure of altruistic
behavior). As far as good actions become suspected of being
motivated by appearances, trying to foster pro-social memory by
making glory public might be a source of noise that undermines
intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), just as small
material rewards do. If so, introducing an image reward should
dampen pro-social PM.
Response latency in the ongoing task should also reveal
important processing differences among conditions. Namely, if
the effect of introducing a pro-social element to the PM task is to
raise the motivational activation of completing the task at hand,
ongoing task latency should decrease under pro-social conditions
(see Brandimonte et al., 2010).
The resolution of the conflict between competing motives
may be either consciously or unconsciously driven. If people are
aware of the potential conflict between pro-social and self-gain
motives, it seems reasonable to predict that when queried about
how likely they would be to remember to perform the pro-social
action under the various conditions, they should say they would
be more likely to do it if they were to help others without reward
than with reward. However, in Brandimonte et al.’s (2010) study,
participants predicted they would be more likely to perform the
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action if the action produced a social and a personal benefit rather
than solely a social benefit. This dissociation between consciously
reported predictions and actual performance argues against the
hypothesis that the decrease observed in pro-social PM behavior
when a reward is introduced is the by-product of the person’s
conscious decision not to perform the pro-social action. Rather,
people do not seem to be aware of the possible collision effects of
competing motives.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Participants and Design
Eighty undergraduates from Suor Orsola Benincasa University
at Naples participated in the experiment (mean age: 22.5, range:
19–28). They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions
(No PM, Pro-social PM/high reward, Pro-social PM/low reward,
and Pro-social PM/no reward). The No-prospective-memory
condition served as control.
An additional group of 60 participants who had not taken
part in the experiment were required to evaluate how important
each of the pro-social situations was to them in everyday life
and to predict, on a 7-point scale, how likely they would be to
perform each of the three actions. The study received approval
from the Ethical Committee of Suor Orsola Benincasa University.
All participants provided informed consent before taking part in
the experiment.
Procedure and Stimulus Materials
Procedure was based on Brandimonte et al.’s (2010) study. On
arrival, the participant was informed that he/she would perform a
computer-based verb identification task. There were 288 three- or
four-syllables verbs, half of which were regular and half irregular.
Each group of regular and irregular verbs was further divided
into three subgroups of 48 verbs each, according to their ending
(in Italian, ARE-ERE-IRE for the regular verbs and ARE/RRE,
ERE, IRE for the irregular verbs). There were three blocks, each
consisting of 48 regular and 48 irregular verbs.Within each block,
the 96 items were presented twice, in random order. Overall, each
participant provided 576 responses.
The ongoing task started with a fixation point that remained in
view for 500ms. Then, each verb appeared and remained in view
for 5 s. The participants had to press one of two counterbalanced
keys, according to whether the verb was regular or irregular.
PM instructions involved remembering to sign a form at the
end of each block. The form was positioned on a table out of
the participant’s sight. Each block was initiated by pressing any
key on the keyboard. At the end of each block, the participant
could either go and sign the form (if she/he remembered the
PM task) or just press any key to start with the next block (if
she/he forgot the PM task). Participants assigned to the No PM
condition performed only the verb identification task.
To make the to-be-performed action socially relevant, the
participants were told that if they will remember to sign the form,
important data would be collected for the experimenter’s thesis.
Thus, in the PM/reward conditions participants received one of
the following instructions: (a) If you’ll remember to sign the
form, you’ll receive 1 euro (Low reward); (b) If you’ll remember
to sign the form, you’ll receive 20 Euro (High reward). It was
made clear that the reward would be provided only to those
participants who signed the form all three times. A No reward
condition reflected a pure pro-social PM task and served as
control.
Before starting with the task, each participant was required to
recall instructions, to ensure that he/she had understood what
to do, and when to do the tasks. Similarly, at the end of the
experimental session, each participant was interviewed again
about the tasks she was supposed to do. Those participants who
forgot (even for 1 time) to sign the form were also interviewed
about the reasons why they did not perform the planned action
as required. In so doing, we ensured that any failure to perform
the PM task was not due to forgetting of the content of the to-be-
performed action. Importantly, no participant knew in advance
that he/she might be rewarded (none of them would therefore
expect to gain a reward before starting with the experiment). In
addition, care was taken to recruit each participant from different
courses, so as to avoid that knowledge of the various reward
conditions could affect participation and performance.
Results and Discussion
All participants recalled correctly what to do and when they were
supposed to do the action. Post-experimental interviews revealed
that failures to perform the action were not due to forgetting of
the content of the action or to non-compliance. All participants
who did not sign the form said that they forgot to do the action
and showed regret for their failure. Results are illustrated in
Table 1.
Prospective Memory Performance
The ANOVA performed on the number of correct PM responses
revealed a significant effect of rewards, F(2, 57) = 7.61, p = 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.21. Planned comparisons showed that, in the presence of
a low reward, participants were significantly worse at performing
the PM task than both under No reward, F(1, 38) = 14.25, p =
0.0004, η2p = 0.27, and High reward, F(1, 38) = 7.53, p = 0.008,
partial η2p = 0.17, conditions. The difference between no-reward
and high reward conditions was not significant (F < 1).
Ratings
Rating analyses were aimed at exploring whether people
consciously decide that accepting a low reward in order to do
a pro-social action is detrimental for their own social image
and, therefore, that the most appropriate behavior is not to
TABLE 1 | Prospective memory accuracy and ongoing response times in
Experiment 1.
PM task Ongoing task
Mean SD Mean SD
No PM – – 2899.65 476.96
No reward 2.8 0.052 2495.69 539.71
Low reward 1.7 1.12 2551.00 580.38
High reward 2.5 1.00 2575.65 689.67
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do the action if one gains a low reward for it. If so, it seems
reasonable to predict that, when asked to say how likely they
would be to perform the planned pro-social action in different
conditions, participants will typically say that they would be
more likely to remember to help others without being rewarded
for that.
To date, participants predicted they would be more likely
to perform the action if the pro-social action produced also a
personal, material benefit, for themselves rather than solely a
social benefit, both when they expected a low reward, F(1, 58) =
9.49, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.14, and a high reward, F(1, 58) = 7.74,
p = 0.006, η2p = 0.12.
Ongoing Task Performance
Response times
We first tabulated the mean response time on correctly answered
trials over the three blocks. Outliers (0.02%) were trimmed by
removing response times that were higher than 4000ms.
A 4 × 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA that contained the between-
subjects variable of PM instructions (No PM, Prosocial PM
without reward, Prosocial PM with low reward, Prosocial PM
with high reward) and the within-subjects variables of Block
(One, Two, Three) and Category (regular and irregular verbs)
was computed. There was a main effect of Category, indicating
that participants were slower at identifying irregular verbs than
regular verbs F(1, 69) = 6.66, p < 0.02, η
2
p = 0.09 and an
effect of Block, F(2, 138) = 43.12, p < 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.38,
indicating that participants speeded up their responses through
blocks. An interaction between Block and Category was found
such that Block improvement was evident for regular but not
for irregular verbs, F(2, 138) = 6.91, p < 0.002, η
2
p = 0.09.
Planned comparisons showed that, as compared to the No PM
condition, performing a prosocial PM task was associated with
faster ongoing task performance, F(1, 38) = 5.57, p < 0.03,
η
2
p = 0.13. No difference was found between any of the reward
conditions and the pro-social condition (all ps> 0.05).
Accuracy
We then computed the proportion of verbs correctly identified
as regular vs. irregular. These data were included in 4 × 3 × 2
mixed ANOVA which showed a significant effect of Category,
confirming that, as expected, identifying regular Italian verbs
is easier than identifying irregular verbs F(1, 76) = 68.02,
p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.47. There was also an effect of Block,
F(2, 152) = 13.35, p < 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.17, in that participants
improved their verb identification performance through blocks.
An interaction between Block and Category was also found such
that block improvement was evident for regular but not for
irregular verbs, F(2, 152) = 13.99, p < 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.18.
There was a main effect of PM instructions, F(3, 76) = 3.77,
p < 0.02, η2p = 0.13, indicating that participants were, in general,
less accurate at performing the categorization task under pro-
social PM conditions than under the No PM condition, possibly
due to their speeded responses. Planned comparisons revealed
that this decrease in accuracy was significant under the pro-
social/no reward condition, F(1, 38) = 9.71, p < 0.003, η
2
p =
0.20. No difference was found in the ongoing task between
any of the reward conditions and the pro-social condition (all
ps> 0.05).
No Responses
Despite the difficulty of the ongoing task, the mean proportion
of no responses throughout the conditions was lower than 7%. A
4 × 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA showed no effects of PM instructions
(p = 0.407). A significant effect of Category emerged, F(1, 76) =
7.05, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.09, in that the rate of no responses
was higher for the irregular than for the regular verbs. The effect
of Block was also significant, F(2, 152) = 38.36, p < 0.0001,
η
2
p = 0.34.
The results from Experiment 1 confirmed that memory for
the intention was significantly worse when a small material
reward was introduced, hence replicating Brandimonte et al.’s
(2010) results. However, it also showed that while a low reward
impairs memory for pro-social intentions, a high reward leaves
performance unaltered, as compared to a pro-social/no reward
condition. One possible interpretation is that a financial reward
always reduces any pro-social motivational effect, but the higher
financial reward is motivating in its own way so that the two
effects cancel out. However, according to the crowding out
model (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), effects of a high reward and
crowding out effects are mutually exclusive. Crowding out effects
can be predicted if and only if a small reward is introduced
under prosocial conditions, which reduces intrinsic motivation
to behave prosocially by virtue of a mechanism of reduced self-
esteem, should the person accept a small reward in order to be
altruistic. To the contrary, a higher financial reward is motivating
in its own way and it does not crowd out intrinsic motivation,
because accepting a substantial reward does not make the person
feel greedy, and rather adds value to the PM action. While
this remains an empirical question to test in future studies,
the present results seem to support the crowding out model,
as they show that only under small reward condition does PM
performance drop.
The results from the ongoing task (faster performance)
converge on the general idea that participants’ intrinsic
motivation is boosted by the pro-social nature of the task.
However, as the ratings clearly show, and in line with previous
results, people are not able to consciously predict their pro-social
PM behavior in the presence of a material reward. To date, they
predict they would be better in the pro-social PM task if they
could also get a material reward, but in fact they perform worse
than in the pro-social/no reward condition when the reward is
a low one and as well as in the pro-social condition/no reward
condition when the reward is a high one (see Brandimonte et al.,
2010).
These results add important refinements to the general
picture emerging from previous studies, but they also open
new questions on the differential role of rewards in influencing
prospective remembering. For example, it is still unknown
whether rewards that involve non-material benefits (such as
disclosure of the pro-social action) may determine a decrease
in pro-social PM, as predicted by economic models of altruism
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
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To explore this issue, in Experiment 2 we assessed
the effectiveness of non-material rewards on participants’
pro-social PM.
EXPERIMENT 2
Methods
Participants and Design
Sixty undergraduates from Suor Orsola Benincasa University at
Naples participated in Experiment 2 (mean age: 23.2, range: 19–
29). None of them had participated in Experiment 1. They were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (No PM, pro-
social PM/no image reward, pro-social PM/image reward). The
No-prospective-memory condition served as control.
An additional group of 50 participants who had not taken part
in the experiment were required to evaluate how important each
of the pro-social situations was to them in everyday life and to
predict, on a 7-point scale, how likely they would be to perform
the pro-social action in each condition.
Procedure and Stimulus Materials
Procedure and materials were the same as those used in
Experiment 1. Participants were all informed that their signatures
were fundamental for the experimenter to complete her thesis
(social relevance). The crucial modification, as compared to
Experiment 1, was that the participants assigned to the image-
reward conditions were also informed that if they remembered to
sign the form, their namewould be published in the booklet of the
activities of the Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and they
would be publicly thanked for their help in the next Lab meeting.
Results and Discussion
All participants but one spontaneously recalled correctly what
to do and when they were supposed to do the action. This
participant recalled instruction with help. Post-experimental
interviews revealed that failures to perform the action were
not due to forgetting of the content of the action or to non-
compliance. Importantly, all the participants who did not sign
the form claimed that they forgot to do the action. Results are
illustrated in Table 2.
Prospective Memory Performance
A One-Way ANOVA performed on the number of correct PM
responses showed a significant effect of PM instructions, with
pro-social PM performance significantly worse in the presence
of an image reward, F(1, 38) = 7.33, p = 0.01, η
2
p = 0.16.
TABLE 2 | Prospective memory accuracy and ongoing response times in
Experiment 2.
PM task Ongoing task
Mean SD Mean SD
No PM 2831.85 441.73
No image reward 2.7 0.66 2431.69 470.11
Image reward 1.95 1.05 2778.97 469.22
Ratings
Participants predicted they would be more likely to perform
the pro-social action if their good action was not made public,
F(1, 49) = 26.79, p = 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.35.
Ongoing Task Performance
Response times
Once again, outliers (0.035%) were trimmed by removing
response times that were higher than 4000ms.
A 3 × 3 × 2 mixed ANOVA that contained the between-
subjects variable of PM instructions (No PM, Prosocial PM/no
image reward, Prosocial PM/image reward) and the within-
subjects variables of Block (One, Two, Three) and Category
(regular and irregular verbs) was computed. There was a main
effect of Category, F(1, 44) = 9.64, p = 0.003, p = 0.003, η
2
p =
0.18 and an effect of Block, F(2, 88) = 47.173, p = 0.0001, η
2
p =
0.52. These effects were qualified by an interaction indicating
that Block improvement was evident for regular but not for
irregular verbs, F(2, 88) = 9.22, p = 0.0002, η
2
p = 0.17. Planned
comparisons showed that, as compared to the No PM condition,
performing a prosocial PM task in the absence of image reward
was associated with faster ongoing task performance, F(1, 38) =
11.01, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.23. However, as compared to
the pro-social condition, performing a pro-social action in the
presence of image reward was associated with slower ongoing
task performance, F(1, 38) = 7.64, p = 0.009, η
2
p = 0.17. There
was no significant correlation between ongoing RTs and PM
performance across conditions (all ps> 0.05).
Accuracy
A 3×3× 2mixed ANOVA showed a significant effect of Category
F(1, 57) = 73.86, p < 0.0001, η
2
p = 0.56. There was also an
effect of Block, F(2, 114) = 6.40, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.10, and an
interaction between Block and Category, F(2, 114) = 12.23, p <
0.0001, η2p = 0.18. There was a main effect of PM instructions,
F(2, 57) = 6.27, p < 0.02, η
2
p = 0.18, indicating that participants
were, in general, less accurate at performing the categorization
task under PM conditions as compared to the No PM condition.
There was no significant correlation between ongoing accuracy
and PM performance across conditions (all ps> 0.05).
No Responses
A 3× 3× 2 mixed ANOVA showed no effects of PM instructions
(p = 0.215). A significant effect of Category emerged, F(1, 57) =
8.30, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.13, in that the rate of no responses
was higher for the irregular than for the regular verbs. The effect
of Block was also significant, F(2, 114) = 31.58, p < 0.0001,
η
2
p = 0.36.
The results from Experiment 2 showed that pro-social PM is
negatively affected by a non-material reward just as it is impaired
by a small material reward (Experiment 1). However, the results
from the ongoing task provide a more complex picture. Ongoing
task performance under the pure Pro-social (i.e., No image
reward) condition showed faster response times, as compared
to the No PM control condition, hence replicating results from
Experiment 1. In contrast, ongoing task performance under
the Pro-social/Image reward condition showed slower response
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times as compared to the control Pro-social condition, hence
revealing costs (Smith, 2008) in the presence of an image reward1.
Coherently, the ratings indicated that people are indeed able
to consciously predict their pro-social PM behavior (i.e., they
predict they would be worse) in the presence of a non-material
reward. However, the lack of correlation between ongoing and
PM performance suggests that such costs were not due to the fact
that participants have directed resources away from the ongoing
task and toward the PM task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Remembering to do things for others is at the heart of a
person’s social life as often our memory for actions is aimed
at providing some benefits to other individuals. Yet, the
mechanisms underlying pro-social PM are still almost totally
unknown. The present article therefore explored whether pro-
social prospective remembering is influenced by the amount
and the type of rewards, using behavioral measures and new
paradigms that, with appropriate modifications, might prove
useful for future studies with neuroimaging techniques.
Overall, the present results added important refinements to
the picture emerging from previous research by showing that,
under socially relevant conditions, introducing a small material
reward (money) or a non-material reward (disclosure of altruistic
behavior) dramatically decreased memory for the intention,
whereas a high material reward left pro-social PM performance
unaltered.
In the present research, we documented, for the first time,
a decrease in pro-social prospective remembering following the
introduction of an image reward. This new finding may be
rather counterintuitive. After all, most pro-social behaviors in
everyday life seem to positively depend on disclosure of the giving
behavior. However, it seems equally plausible that if people are
mostly concerned about not appearing a double-faced person,
introducing a social-image reward may have a detrimental effect
on motivation and therefore people may not feel motivated
to comply with the pro-social task if they are rewarded for
that (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Indeed, as far as good
actions become suspected of being motivated by appearances,
trying to foster pro-social memory by making glory public may
be embarrassing for the person. Cognitive evaluation theory
(CET; Deci and Ryan, 1985) predicts that rewards only reduce
intrinsic motivation when they are perceived as controlling the
behavior, and might actually enhance intrinsic motivation if they
engender feelings of competence. Whether rewards undermine
the initial “intrinsic” (not narrowly self-interested) motivation
for the targeted behavior may therefore depend on whether the
reward is seen as an attempt to “purchase” the behavior from the
individual.
Such an interpretation is supported by the present results. In
particular, analyses of the ongoing task performance provided a
1Commonly, monitoring costs are measured by comparing conditions with a PM
task with conditions without a PM task. However, this is appropriate only when the
only change between the two conditions is the presence of a PM task. In the present
research, especially on the basis of hypotheses, the most appropriate comparisons
were pro-social PM vs. No PM conditions, on the one hand, and pro-social PM vs.
pro-social/reward conditions, on the other hand.
rather consistent picture. To date, in Experiment 1, ongoing task
performance in the pro-social condition was faster than in the
control condition. In contrast, in Experiment 2, ongoing costs
emerged in the presence of the image reward, as compared to
the pro-social condition. The lack of correlation between ongoing
and PM performance might indicate that the slowing down of
response times reflects attentional costs due to the participants’
motivation of not appearing a double-faced person, rather than
attentional costs due to the fact that participants have directed
resources away from the ongoing task and toward the PM task.
This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the activity-
based PM task was very simple and could be performed without
any ongoing cost (Experiment 1, see also Brandimonte et al.,
2010).
Consistent with social and economic models of pro-social
behavior and with recent neuroimaging research (Murayama
et al., 2010), these results hint to a conclusion in terms of intrinsic
motivation vs. extrinsic motivation as important determinants
of human behavior, with intrinsic motivation susceptible of
being modulated by rewards, hence affecting pro-social PM. In
particular, while these studies showed, once again, that intrinsic
motivation is susceptible of being undermined by reward, it
is also clear that such rewards do not need to be material
ones, as both material and non-material rewards impaired PM
performance. In addition to crowding out effects, these results
highlight important processing differences in the way material
and non-material rewards interact with intrinsic motivation.
To date, while both small and high material rewards appear
to modulate motivation (though in opposite directions) by
operating outside of the person’s awareness, introducing an
image reward appears to produce motivation crowding out
through a conscious process, as indicated by the ongoing task
analyses and by the results from the ratings (see also Brandimonte
et al., 2010).
While we know nothing on the neural correlates of pro-social
PM under different reward conditions, a reversed inference,
from extant neuroimaging results to plausible predictions of the
present studies, can be attempted. For instance, increased level of
tonic activity in the network of brain regions including the right
lateral, the right parietal cortex, the dorsal medial frontal cortex,
and the left cerebellummight predict motivation-related changes
in pro-social PMperformance due to the introduction of different
amounts of rewards, as observed in the present experiments. In
particular, as documented by Murayama et al. (2010), decreases
in the activity of the anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas
(LPFC) should be related to behavioral undermining effects
observed in our experiments with small monetary rewards,
whereas, as documented by Albrecht et al. (2014), activation in
the striatum might be related to the better performance observed
under high amount of monetary reward, hence reflecting a higher
perceived self-determination. From our results, one might also
speculate that, despite crowding out effects occur with both types
of reward, the differences in the ongoing task response times
that we observed between material and non-material rewards
(longer ongoing task response times in the non-material reward
condition) might be differentially related to the activity of the
anterior striatum and the prefrontal areas, with a moderate
decrease in those areas in the presence of non-material rewards
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and a higher decrease in the presence of a material reward.
Last but not least, extant results from neuroimaging studies
of PM seem to fit well with the present results. Indeed, the
striking differences observed in the pattern of RTs and ratings
between our experiments might reflect differences in the degree
of spontaneous retrieval guided by material vs. non-material
rewards, in accordante with the Multiprocess view (McDaniel
and Einstein, 2000, 2007) and the Gateway Hypothesis (Burgess
et al., 2007).
Despite the above reasoning is speculative and relies on
reverse inference, we, nonetheless, believe it might be useful for
guiding future research.
In conclusion, the present results highlight the theoretical
significance of considering the interaction between motivational
and cognitive mechanisms when investigating memory for
delayed intentions in social contexts and call for a deeper
investigation of this phenomenon with neuroimaging
techniques.
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